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Summary 
The last few decades have seen heated debates over the issue of international labour standards. As 
governments sign up to international trade agreements, some of their constituencies call for the inclusion 
of labour agreements that would oblige them to abide by certain standards protecting workers’ rights. 
Some oppose this demand on the grounds that it would interfere with free trade; others object because 
they feel labour standards may be applied unfairly, in ways that would harm the workers they are intended 
to help. This paper reviews the economic and political arguments for international labour standards, 
particularly those found in the global North. It concludes that while there are many reasons why workers 
in the global South may be suspicious of initiatives coming from the North, there are strong reasons to 
support the demand for international labour standards as a means for workers to organise and an 
opportunity to build cross-border solidarity. In the end, it is not so much the standards themselves, but 
the way in which the fight for the standards happens and the way in which they are used that matters 
most. The struggle for labour standards should be seen as a tool to aid workers to organise, rather than as 
a solution to poor working conditions. 
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Preface 
Citizenship DRC working paper: debate on labour standards, workers’ rights and the challenge of 
accountability: global perspectives and local realities. 
The Realising Rights and Claiming Accountability Research Programme of the Citizenship DRC sees 
the improvement of accountability mechanisms within civil society and the corporate sector as central to 
making development policy more responsive to people’s struggles to realise their rights. One of the key 
questions this group has been dealing with is:  
 
• Do “rights” and standards make a difference? And how are they translated in specific contexts? 
 
These working papers address this question specifically on the issue of labour standards by creating a 
dialogue between a “Northern” and a “Southern” perspective. These papers tackle the different discourses 
on labour standards, analysing who is making these claims and on what grounds, and what are the 
different perspectives from different stakeholders from the local to the global level, in the North and in 
the South. These papers were conceived as part of an action research project whereby researchers from 
the north and south put forward their arguments to each other, debate their positions and engage in joint 
research in each others’ contexts to examine the implications to implement different approaches to 
corporate, state and multilateral accountability, such as labour standards, for workers in contexts that they 
are not familiar with and to consider whether – and how – the interests of such workers can be reconciled. 
Working papers in this debate include: 
The case for international labour standards: a “Northern” perspective, by Stephanie Luce 
The problem with international labour standards: a “Southern” perspective, by Naila Kabeer 
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1  Introduction 
The last several decades, and particularly since the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in 1993 and the launching of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995, have seen heated 
debates over the issue of international labour standards. As “pro-trade” governments sign onto trade 
agreements, some of their constituency calls out for the inclusion of labour agreements that would 
mandate countries involved in the agreements to abide by certain standards protecting workers’ rights. But 
the calls for labour standards are controversial, and the debates have created strange allies. On the one 
hand, labour standards advocates include nationalist politicians and protectionist trade union bureaucrats, 
worried about saving jobs. But it also includes many human rights and anti-sweatshop activists, as well as 
several unions with a more international perspective. On the other hand, opponents of labour standards 
include free-marketeers who object to government regulations on trade; also feminist activists and NGOs 
who fear that labour standards could result in job loss for some of the most vulnerable workers in the 
world, such as young women in the global south who have little opportunity for economic independence. 
In this paper I review the arguments by different sides of the labour standards debate and take a 
close look at who the actual voices are. While many have framed this as a struggle on the traditional left 
between the global north and the global south, I find the views of unions, anti-sweatshop activists and 
NGOs to be much more varied – both in the North and the South. I begin the paper with an effort to 
categorise different types of labour standards. The term is used loosely, but can refer to at least three 
major kinds of standards: government regulations, trade agreements, and voluntary codes. I argue that 
debates over standards should consider all three forms and recognise that each form has strengths and 
weaknesses. Workers’ movements may find the need to utilise all three forms at various stages in order to 
improve their conditions of work. I then review some of the major arguments relevant to the debate. 
First, there are economic questions about the relation between market interventions and employment, 
between growth and equality, and between wages and poverty. Second, there are political and technical 
questions about monitoring and enforcement. Finally, there are political questions about standards versus 
rights, what counts as a right, who determines what rights are, and the relationship between self-
organisation and solidarity movements. This section includes examples of how labour standards can be 
used in international struggles for workers’ rights. 
 
2  Workers’ rights in an international context 
It is challenging to talk about international labour standards without discussing the larger economic and 
political context in which they exist. At the heart is the fundamental need to raise the standard of living of 
much of the world’s population. This includes the majority of people in the global south, whether they are 
part of the formal or rapidly growing informal economy. It also includes a growing share of people in the 
global north: the permanently unemployed and disenfranchised, and a growing share of workers earning 
poverty-level wages. To do this would require a massive redistribution of wealth, as well as a vision of 
how to create a secure safety net. It would also require addressing the fact that no capitalist economy has 
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ever solved the issue of unemployment, which means in capitalist economies that there will always be 
groups of people without means to income through work, and that there will always be competition over 
jobs.  
Addressing these large issues requires finding economic systems that address at least two 
fundamental problems: providing economic security for those who don’t have formal jobs, and improving 
the wages and working conditions for those that do. In a global economy, it also requires that we have just 
and fair mechanisms of governance that address the movement of capital, goods, services and people 
across borders. 
Given these challenges, the debate over international labour standards is already limited, in that 
standards can really only address the second issue: improving conditions for those who hold formal jobs. 
No matter how effective labour standards might be at doing that, they alone cannot solve the problem of 
providing a safety net for those in the informal economy. Therefore, at their best, labour standards can 
only be a complement to other strategies or policies for improving the standards of living for the global 
working class. However, it is possible that international labour standards, or the systems of governance set 
up to enforce them, could have adverse effects – such as by moving some from the formal to the informal 
sector, or by increasing the barriers for movement from the informal to formal sector. For this reason, we 
must evaluate the merit of labour standards by several criteria. First, can they improve the standard of 
living for the workers they cover? Second, do they have unanticipated negative consequences? Third, are 
there other options that would be preferable alternatives? Finally, does the struggle for labour standards 
have the potential to achieve other political aims? 
 
3  International labour standards: an overview 
First, we must begin with a definition of international labour standards, because the phrase refers to 
different things. We must distinguish between at least three different forms that labour standards can take: 
government regulations, trade agreements and voluntary codes. These are not mutually exclusive, but each 
carries a different approach and mechanism for enforcement, so each will be discussed separately below.  
In addition, there are differences in the content of the labour standards. The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) has defined 180 conventions and 185 recommendations for improving working 
conditions. According to the ILO, eight of these conventions are fundamental to humane working 
conditions in any country, regardless of level of development and are the necessary foundation to winning 
any other rights at work. In this way, they can be considered rights – which do not vary from country to 
country, more than standards, which can vary.1 Some make the distinction between labour rights, which are 
about processes, while standards are about outcomes. This means that labour rights, such as the right to  
                                                    
1  Guy Standing of the ILO argues that ‘In developing a strategy [for labour standards], you need to identify a 
core of standards that are a floor of human decency; then practices that accord with a country’s capacities and a 
firm’s size and structure; and then standards that are reasonable aspirations.’ (Standing 2001). 
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organise unions, create a process by which labour market outcomes, such as wage levels, are determined. 
Therefore, the content of labour standards regulations or agreements could include labour rights or 
processes, and/or labour standards or outcomes.2  
The eight core conventions can be put into four categories: (1) abolition of forced labour; 
(2) abolition of child labour; (3) elimination of discrimination; and (4) the right to organise and freedom of 
association. According to economists Elliott and Freeman (2003), the abolition of forced labour and the 
elimination of discrimination are relatively non-controversial, and while there appears to be long-term 
consensus on the need to abolish child labour, its application in the short-term is disputed. Some argue 
that eliminating child labour without addressing poverty would simply lead to starvation for the children 
and their families. Finally, Elliott and Freeman note that the ILO freedom of association standard is the 
most controversial, and perhaps one that employers violate most frequently. 
Countries can belong to the ILO even if they do not sign on to the conventions. As of 2004, 163 of 
the 177 member countries had signed onto one of the forced labour standards; 150 to one of the child 
labour standards; 161 to the anti-discrimination; and 154 to the freedom of association. The US is one of 
the countries signed onto the fewest: it has only signed onto the elimination of forced labour (signed in 
1991) and the elimination of the worst forms of child labour (1999).  
In addition to these eight core standards, some suggest adding the freedom of movement, or right to 
migrate, to the fundamental rights of workers. Because the international trade agreements make it easier 
for capital to move across national borders, some argue that labour should be given comparable rights. 
While the ILO has a few conventions that relate to the right of migrants (such as Convention 97, the 
‘Migration for Employment Convention of 1949’), these primarily relate to the rights of migrant workers, 
and not the right to migrate. 
In contrast to the conventions, which can be considered labour rights, there are labour standards, 
which can vary from country to country. These include such things as minimum wage laws, health and 
pension benefits, other benefits such as paid holidays and vacations, and maternity leave. Health and 
safety laws are somewhat ambiguous: some argue that these should be fundamental rights, while others 
suggest that they are more like standards which vary from country to country (Elliot and Freeman 2003). 
It is possible that some health and safety provisions, such as fire extinguishers and bathroom breaks, 
should be considered rights, while others, such as safety goggles, are standards (See Table 3.1). Some, such 
as Singh and Zammit (2004) have argued that the core standards should include ‘the right to a decent 
living’ or a right to a living wage.  
 
                                                    
2  Elliot and Freeman (2003) distinguish between cash and non-cash standards: cash standards are those that cost 
money, such as higher wages and health benefits. Non-cash standards are those that have no direct cost, such 
as abolishing child labour. 
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Table 3.1 Labour rights versus labour standards 
Labour rights Labour standards 
Freedom of association Minimum wage or living wage laws 
Right to collective bargaining Health insurance 
Abolition of forced labour Maternity leave 
Abolition of child labour Pension 
No discrimination in employment and wages Paid vacation or holidays 
Freedom of movement/right to migrate Health and safety standards (though could be 
considered a right) 
 
Approaching labour rights as human rights can add to the current rights-based debates in development 
that tend to ignore workers’ rights. According to the United Nations, a rights-based approach in 
development provides a framework that allows practitioners and governments to focus on development 
policy that “is normatively based on international human rights standards and operationally directed to 
promoting and protecting human rights”, rather than a sole or primary focus on economic growth (United 
Nations 2002). Although a rights-based approach introduces concepts of participation, empowerment and 
accountability, labour rights are not usually explicitly addressed.  
 
4  Forms of labour standards 
We now return to the question of the forms that are used to promote labour rights and standards. The 
first is government regulation, which refers to federal, state or local laws that regulate labour conditions. 
These come with the power of “hard law,” meaning that workers can sometimes lodge formal complaints 
and governments can penalise companies found in non-compliance. In the US, the main labour standards 
struggle in the 1800s and early 1900s was for a shorter working day (initially for a 12 hour working day, 
then 10 hour, and then eight hour), and for minimum wage laws. Other labour standards included 
restrictions on the use of child labour, requirement of overtime pay, and health and safety laws. Labour 
standards in the US also include the right to form a union and engage in collective bargaining. 
Workers in the US are often surprised to learn that labour laws and regulations are often stronger in 
other countries, including those in the global North and South. For example, workers in Mexico are 
entitled by law to holidays and vacations, wages paid in cash, severance pay and profit sharing. Of course, 
the laws themselves do not guarantee that employers will comply, and labour laws are commonly violated 
around the world (Sengenberger 2002). This is in part because most countries are seriously understaffed in 
terms of government labour inspectors. Still, laws can give workers some leverage in their struggle for 
labour rights and standards. 
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Table 4.1 Forms of labour standards 
 Government 
regulations 
Trade rules and 
agreements 
Voluntary corporate 
codes 
Negotiated  
codes 
Main target Corporations Countries Corporations and their 
subcontractors 
Corporations and 
their 
subcontractors 
Usual method 
of monitoring 
Labour inspectors 
(hired by 
government) 
Bodies such as the 
NAALC; the ILO 
Social auditing (Verité, 
Price Waterhouse 
Coopers) – “vigilantes 
and verifiers” 
Social auditing 
(WRC, NGOs) – 
“vigilantes and 
verifiers” 
Penalty Fines Fines; quotas Bad publicity; 
consumer boycott 
Bad publicity; 
possible legal 
actions 
Coverage Labour rights and 
standards 
Usually emphasises 
labour rights rather than 
standards 
Labour rights and 
standards 
Labour rights and 
standards 
Examples Minimum wage 
laws; child labour 
laws 
US Generalised System 
of Preferences; NAFTA 
Labour Side Agreement 
Levi’s Corporate Code 
of Conduct 
Global Framework 
Agreements 
Strengths Enforceability, 
“hard law” 
Fills in holes not covered 
domestic laws; 
international pressure 
may be only way to get 
government 
accountability 
Power of consumer 
pressure 
More enforceable 
than top-down 
voluntary codes 
Weaknesses Domestic focus; 
can have laws on 
books but not 
enforced 
Reduces to country 
versus country approach; 
penalises country v. 
company 
Weak enforcement Potential trap of 
company v. 
company 
approach 
 
The second form of labour standards are those attached to trade agreements. These can range from 
domestic policies that govern a country’s trade, such as the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); 
bilateral agreements, such as the US-Jordan; or multilateral agreements. In some cases the labour 
standards are incorporated directly into the agreement whereas with the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), labour rights were included as a labour side-agreement. Some have proposed 
including labour (and environmental) standards into the WTO, also known as the “social clause”. We will 
discuss each of these in order. 
First are domestic efforts at imposing international labour standards through unilateral trade policy. 
The US has a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which gives greater access (duty-free) to US 
markets to those countries who meet certain conditions.3 In 1984, the GSP legislation was amended to 
include specific labour standards as part of those conditions, including the freedom of association and 
abolition of child and forced labour. Specifically, if a country is found to violate some of the conditions, it 
can lose its duty-free status. Since the GSP conditions were adopted, US unions and NGOs have filed 
dozens of petitions against trade with other countries where labour rights are being violated. Elliot and 
Freeman summarise the petitions filed between 1984 and 2000 and find that of the relevant and accepted  
                                                    
3  The European Union also has a similar system of preferences. 
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petitions, about half (15 out of 32) resulted in successful changes, and half (17 out of 32) did not. Elliot 
and Freeman conclude that the successful cases were in countries that had a greater percentage of exports 
to the US and countries with more resources (greater per capita income). 
Another variation of unilateral policy is the 1974 US Trade Act, which lays out principles of fair trade 
between the US and trading partners. Although it has been used in the past to challenge violations of trade 
related to intellectual property rights or dumping, the Trade Act has never been used to file claims based 
on violation of workers rights (or “social dumping”). However, in 2004, the American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) filed the first charge related to labour standards. 
Specifically, the AFL-CIO asserted that Section 301(d) of the 1974 US Trade Act can and should be used 
to rectify unfair advantages in trade that China enjoys due to systematic repression of workers’ rights. 
Section 301(d) ‘is the principal statutory authority under which the United States may impose trade 
sanctions against foreign countries that maintain acts, policies and practices that violate, or deny US rights 
or benefits under, trade agreements, or are unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or 
restrict US commerce’ (Grier 2001). The AFL-CIO petition argues that since China persistently denies 
workers freedom of association, encourages forced labour, does not enforce its own wage, hours and 
safety laws, China receives a cost-advantage in competing with US firms. The petition calls on the US 
Trade Representative and President to impose trade remedies or sanctions against China, to compensate 
for this cost advantage and that the US should enter into no new trade agreements unless the WTO 
requires members to enforce workers’ rights. There has been no decision in this case as of October 2004, 
but the petition represents another approach to enforcing labour standards across borders. Elliott and 
Freeman find that even when the Trade Act is used to apply economic sanctions in non-labour cases, it is 
only moderately successful. Their data on Trade Act cases from 1985 to 1994 shows that while economic 
sanctions are more effective than GSP rulings in changing behaviours, the success rate is still only 61 per 
cent (compared to a 47 per cent success rate in GSP rulings for the same period).  
The idea of attaching labour standards to bilateral or multilateral trade agreements is intended to 
create international mechanisms for labour law enforcement. Critics point out that the core ILO 
conventions have little meaning on the ground, as many countries that have signed on fail to comply with 
the standards. While the ILO has the ability to investigate and make public non-compliance, it has no 
power to enforce. Thus, the ILO standards become most useful as an educational tool. Because of this, 
advocates of international labour standards argue for stronger mechanisms to enforce worker rights. 
One model already in place is the labour side agreements of NAFTA, known as the North American 
Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC).4 The NAALC was negotiated as a parallel agreement to 
NAFTA after unions pressured their governments to include labour standards if they were going to pass 
NAFTA. The NAALC created a Commission on Labour Cooperation, comprised of the labour secretary 
from each country and a secretariat to oversee the enforcement of the NAALC. The NAALC basically 
                                                    
4  Labour standards also exist in a few other US trade agreements, including the US Free Trade Agreements with 
Cambodia, Morocco, Jordan, Canada, Chile and Singapore. Trade agreements with labour standards in other 
countries include the Mercosur Social-Labour Declaration. 
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requires each country to comply with its domestic labour laws. Each country established a National 
Administrative Office within its Department of Labour. These offices work with the Commission in order 
to monitor compliance.  
Similar to the ILO, the NAALC has little power. None of the organisations established under the 
NAALC have legal power to force the US, Mexico or Canada to enforce their laws, or to override federal 
or state laws. In reality, the Commission serves as a body to hear complaints and only has the power of 
“soft law”. It can investigate non-compliance and recommend fines or sanctions in cases where there are 
violations of minimum wage, child labour and safety and health violations. In cases of violations of 
worker rights to organise, the Commission is only allowed to recommend that the employer change the 
behaviour. However, even the conservative think tank Heritage Foundation acknowledges, ‘A long and 
cumbersome process must be followed before either fines or sanctions can be resorted to, with many 
safeguards limiting any potential action’ (Smith 1993). On the 10 year anniversary of the NAALC, 
researchers at the University of California, Los Angeles, examined the performance of the Commission 
and concluded that while the agreements had managed to investigate and expose instances of labour 
standards violations: ‘The NAALC has failed to protect workers’ rights to safe jobs and is in danger of 
fading into oblivion’ (Delp et al. 2004). Despite these failures, some activists continue to call for labour 
standards to be attached to trade agreements such as Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). 
In fact, Delp and her co-authors argue that including standards directly rather than as a side agreement 
will help improve chances for enforcement.  
There is also debate over including labour standards into the WTO, or giving the ILO power of 
“hard law” to enforce labour standards in conjunction with WTO rulings. Critics note that even though 
the WTO is supposed to be democratic, with one-country/one-vote, the reality is otherwise. Wealthy 
countries have more power because they have more weight in much of the negotiations (the “green 
room” negotiations). In addition, wealthy countries have more power to ignore WTO rulings, as we’ll 
discuss more below. One concern about adding labour standards to the WTO is that the countries that 
might be most affected will have the least amount of say in setting up the structure. For example, it is 
possible that large apparel-producing countries such as Bangladesh, El Salvador and Thailand could be 
excluded from the negotiations that establish the labour standards and their enforcement. However, 
according to Martin Khor of the Third World Network, initial resistance of developing countries to labour 
standards “softened” in recent WTO ministerials (Khor 1997). In the 1996 Singapore meetings, countries 
agreed to include language affirming commitment to international labour standards in the WTO text – this 
text asserts that the ILO is the appropriate body to continue work on the issue and that labour standards 
cannot be used for protectionist purposes. 
Still, the concern about unequal power remains, and relegating enforcement to the ILO will not 
necessary resolve all problems. Many critics of the ILO argue that this organisation is not adequate for 
dealing with labour relations in most countries. The ILO was constructed on a model of corporatist 
tripartite structures. This model recognises corporations, governments and unions, but does not recognise 
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non-union workers, rank and file union members, NGOs or other elements of civil society. Given the 
structure and emphasis on collective bargaining, the ILO also has little to say to informal sector workers.  
A third form of labour standards included is voluntary mechanisms (see Table 4.2). One common 
method is the use of corporate codes of conduct. Some corporations themselves have developed internal 
codes that specify the conditions under which their production will occur. Levi-Strauss was the one of the 
first corporations to establish such a code in the early 1990s, in response to growing consumer and NGO 
pressure on companies to reduce the incidence of sweatshops. 
There are several problems with voluntary codes. First, the codes differ greatly from company to 
company, making it difficult for consumers to know what code compliance means. Second, companies 
cannot be expected to adequately enforce their own standards. In some cases, they hire outside monitors – 
including accounting firms or private organisations such as Verité – to investigate compliance. One 
prominent group is Social Accountability International (SAI), a US-based non-profit organisation that 
works to investigate sweatshops. SAI has developed the SA8000, a voluntary international workplace 
standard (similar to the ISO9000, a voluntary international quality standard). However, even these efforts 
have been criticised for a lack of transparency. Since it is the corporations that hire the monitors, the 
corporations still have control over which factories are inspected, when inspections occur and how much 
of the report will be available to the public. 
These lead to another form of voluntary standards: negotiated codes. These are similar to corporate 
codes in that they generally lack the power of hard law. However, they are not instituted from the top-
down. Instead, they are the result of bottom-up pressures from workers, unions or consumer groups, and 
the codes have buy-in from multiple stakeholders. One form of the negotiated codes is Global Framing 
Agreements, which are negotiated between corporations and entities such as the International Textile, 
Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation. So far, there are several dozen Global Framing Agreements in 
existence, of varying strength. 
Another example of negotiated codes comes from the US university-based anti-sweatshop 
movement. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, student groups around the country affiliated with the United 
Students Against Sweatshops, and pressured their colleges and universities to adopt codes that governed 
the universities purchases of apparel. In addition, the students created a non-profit independent 
monitoring organisation called the Workers Rights Consortium (WRC). The WRC is funded by member 
universities and run by a board consisting of students, university representatives and independent labour 
rights experts. Their approach is to work with the licensees to make sure apparel is produced in factories 
that are not violating workers’ rights – inside and outside of the US. The WRC acknowledges that it 
cannot inspect every factory producing college-logo apparel, but it attempts to collect accurate and 
systematic information about conditions in as many factories as it can. The WRC has no legal authority to 
enforce its codes – rather, it relies on informational and pressure campaigns to get factories to comply 
with standards. According to the WRC website, the goal ‘is not to embarrass licensees but to promote real  
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improvements in factory conditions. For this reason, when violations are identified at a factory, the WRC 
always generally seeks to give licensees an opportunity to address the problems prior to the issuance of a 
public report.’5  
Now that we have discussed the variation in the content and form of labour standards, I turn to the 
arguments for and against them. Recently, the arguments receiving the most attention are related to 
attaching standards to trade agreements. However, many of the arguments are similar to those used 
regularly in debates over establishing domestic regulations. This includes both economic and political 
arguments, which I review below. 
 
5  Economic arguments for and against labour standards 
The main arguments against “hard law” labour standards come from several perspectives. First, free 
market advocates argue that labour standards interfere with free trade, thereby impeding opportunities for 
economic growth. Rather, the best avenue for improving wages and working conditions is to open 
economies to more unrestricted trade. Poor countries with little infrastructure or technology will find a 
comparative advantage in competing on low cost labour. Labour standards would only hinder these 
countries advantage in international trade.  
Second, some NGO and workers rights’ groups argue that labour standards will be applied unevenly, 
punishing the most vulnerable countries most harshly. This in turn will hurt workers who hold these jobs. 
In many cases those working in maquiladoras face few other opportunities for employment. Some have 
been pushed off their land or out of public sector jobs due to stabilisation and structural adjustment 
policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. As Naila Kabeer points out 
in The Power to Choose, jobs in the apparel export industry may provide the only or best avenue to 
independence for women in countries like Bangladesh (2000). Scholars such as Singh and Zammit note 
that while they believe labour standards are desirable and an important indicator of economic 
development, using trade sanctions to enforce standards is the wrong approach. Instead, they argue that 
‘their promotion is best achieved in a non-coercive and supportive international environment, such as that 
provided by the ILO’ (Singh and Zammit 2004: 102). 
Labour standards’ advocates also come from different perspectives. Some of the most vocal come 
from the US labour movement, which has had a history of opposing “free trade”.6 This group asserts that 
reducing tariffs and quotas will do several things: first, increase foreign imports which are produced at 
lower prices, reducing demand for US-made products and therefore cutting US jobs. Second, trade 
agreements reduce restrictions on the mobility of US firms, allowing them to shift production to other 
                                                    
5  Workers Rights Consortium, www.workersrights.org/about_faq.asp.  
6  Interestingly, while there is a commonly held perception that US unions are among the most vocal advocates of 
international labour standards, it is difficult to find much evidence of this in the media. For example, Lexis-
Nexis searches of major newspapers for stories on labour standards and unions find a far greater number of 
stories from other countries than for the US. This may be because US newspapers tend not to deal with union 
issues – but at the same time, even in US union press releases and on union websites, the topic of labour 
standards is generally not prominent, or in some cases, even evident.  
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countries, also eliminating US jobs. In the 1980s and early 90s the attention was on manufacturing jobs, 
but this has increasingly affected service sector jobs as well (e.g. call centres, data entry, IT, financial 
services). The argument for labour standards says that countries paying low wages enjoy an unfair 
advantage in trade, and US workers should not have to compete for jobs against countries where wage 
levels are much lower (Singh and Amit 2000). 
As Kabeer rightly points out, proponents of labour standards often work from protectionist motives, 
such as with the efforts of the Child Labour Coalition (a Washington DC based NGO) and the Asian-
American Free Labour Institute (an AFL-CIO constituency group) to ban child labour in Bangladesh. 
Another notorious example has been the efforts by the International Brotherhood of the Teamsters to 
keep NAFTA from opening the trucking industry beyond the border regions. In radio ads, mailings and 
public presentations, Teamsters officials argued that Mexican truck-drivers were likely to smuggle drugs 
into the country and lower safety conditions. At a conference of labour educators in 2000, Teamster staff 
member Gerald Boesen stated that Mexican truck-drivers are likely to be ‘on coke’ and to ‘patch up their 
trucks with bubble gum’.7 
On the other hand, there are some in the labour movement who also advocate for international 
labour standards but align themselves more closely to anti-sweatshop activists, NGOs, and some in the 
global South who assert that international labour standards should be included in trade agreements in 
order to give some moral and legal backing to workers’ efforts around the world to combat multinationals 
and protect workers’ rights. For example, United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) has evolved over 
time to have a much more nuanced view of international labour issues. US students new to the sweatshop 
issue often begin with a view that all work in the global South is “sweatshop work” and the women who 
hold these jobs are passive victims. They generally begin with a desire to purchase “American-made” 
apparel that they believe is “sweat-free”. However, over time most USAS leaders have come to realise that 
these images are not necessarily correct – that US apparel may be produced in sweatshops as well, that 
boycotting apparel from other countries solves nothing and could in fact harm workers, that other 
industries beyond apparel can also have “sweatshop”-like conditions, and that the women working in 
these workplaces have agency.  
The first principle of USAS states:  
 
We work in solidarity with working people’s struggles. In order to best accomplish this and in 
recognition of the interconnections between local and global struggles, we strive to build 
relationships with other progressive movements and cooperate in coalition with other groups 
struggling for justice within all communities campus, local, regional, and international.8 
 
This principle developed over time as USAS activists learned that they alone could not “solve” the issue of 
sweatshops and that their role was best suited to providing solidarity support to workers’ struggles in the 
                                                    
7  Gerald Boesen, ‘South of the Border: A Union’s Position on Cross-Border Trucking’, presentation at the 
UCLEA Conference, Milwaukee, WI. 15 April 2000. 
8  USAS, www.studentsagainstsweatshops.org/about/about.php.  
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US and around the globe. USAS and the WRC together have worked to build alliances with unions, 
workers and NGOs in the global south – particularly in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. For 
example, after the WRC released a fact-finding report in 2001 showing that the Kuk Dong factory in 
Atlixco de Puebla, Mexico had illegally fired workers trying to form an independent union, USAS 
mobilised a campaign in support of the Kuk Dong employees. Students called on Nike and Reebok to 
pressure Kuk Dong into rehiring the workers and recognising the union. Eventually, the company caved 
in and rehired all fired workers – an action virtually unheard of until that point. USAS and the WRC have 
also worked on campaigns related to US workers and working conditions, such as at the New Era hat 
company in upstate New York. 
Robert Ross and Anita Chan argue that these kinds of examples suggest that debates over labour 
standards are actually not a North-South debate, but really a South versus South debate (Ross and Chan 
2002). For example, they point out that while trade unions from India, Zimbabwe and Zambia have been 
vocal opponents to linking trade and labour standards, others in the South – notably South Africa and 
parts of Latin America have mostly argued in favour, based on positive experiences using labour standards 
to win gains for workers. In a regional meeting convened by the National Research Council, Homero 
Fuentes of the Commission for the Verification of Corporate Codes of Conduct (COVERCO) in 
Guatemala also argued that labour standards must be included in trade agreements and adequate resources 
must be provided to train inspectors and judges, collect data and educate workers (National Research 
Council 2004). Kelly Zidana of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions-Afro, Kenya, adds 
that although many African countries incorporated the core labour rights in their constitutions, there are 
challenges to implementing these rights. In part, he argues that the IMF and World Bank have made it 
more difficult to enforce labour laws. Therefore, there is a need to strengthen international institutions like 
the ILO, so that they can enforce labour law and counter-balance the IMF and World Bank (National 
Research Council 2004). Unions elsewhere have even suggested some support for including labour 
standards in trade agreements. According to Ross and Chan, ‘the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 
believes the “social clause can be a significant and effective instrument to protect and achieve social rights 
and the base trade union rights”’. Ross and Chan suggest that the differences in opinions in the global 
South rest in part on the histories of labour solidarity between countries. For example, ‘unions in 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua have strategically used the US threat of trade sanctions’ to bolster 
their own right to organise workers. We’ll discuss this more in a later section. 
Given this range of opinions on the pros and cons of international labour standards, we will now 
review the research on some of the key questions: do labour standards reduce employment? Do labour 
standards hurt poor countries? Can labour standards be effective in improving working conditions for 
most workers? And are there other methods for raising standards that might be more effective? 
 
5.1 Do labour standards lead to unemployment? 
The first objection to labour standards begins from an ideological one: the fundamental belief of 
neoclassical economists that wage regulations will reduce employment in the firm. This argument is used 
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against domestic labour standards as well as international. Economist Paul Krugman wrote in a critique of 
US living wage ordinances in 1998, ‘So what are the effects of increasing minimum wages? Any Econ 101 
student can tell you the answer: the higher wage reduces the quantity of labour demanded, and hence leads 
to unemployment’. However, Krugman admits that finding empirical evidence to support this theoretical 
assertion has ‘been hard to confirm with actual data’. After decades of debates over federal and state 
minimum wages, the evidence on their impact is mixed. Some economists argue that the most persuasive 
study to date is the “natural experiments” of David Card and Alan Krueger, who looked at firm-level data 
in fast food restaurants along the New Jersey and Pennsylvania border after New Jersey raised its state 
minimum wage from $4.25 to $5.05 in 1992 (Card and Krueger 1995). Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom among neoclassical economists, Card and Krueger found that employers did not automatically 
reduce employment. Rather, their findings suggest that several factors came together to pay the higher 
wage. First, the fast food restaurants were able to raise prices by a small amount. Second, employers found 
that with the higher wage, they had higher productivity – perhaps due to lower turnover and absenteeism. 
These factors can allow employers to cover a higher minimum wage without reducing employment. 
Card and Krueger repeated their work in other areas, again showing that theoretical predictions don’t 
necessarily hold. In The Living Wage: Building a Fair Economy, Pollin and Luce (2000) examine employment 
trends over time and argue that macro-economic conditions are much more important for determining 
unemployment trends than are minimum wage laws. In addition, economists now have data from the 
movement to pass regional living wage ordinances in US cities over the past decade. Once again, 
opponents argued that setting higher wage rates for workers would lead to lay-offs and fewer jobs. 
However, no one has yet been able to find empirical evidence to support this claim.9 In fact, over time the 
opponents have changed their argument and now claim that the ordinances will not necessarily reduce 
employment, but allow employers to replace current workers with more skilled employees, thereby hurting 
the workers the ordinances were meant to help. 
On the international level, the ILO has done studies comparing the Human Development Enterprise 
(HDE) Index across firms. The HDE provides firm-level indices of management preferences and 
processes, as well as outcomes (such as work security, skill development and economic democracy) and 
combines these factors into a score that ranges from zero to 25. The data shows that there is a strong 
correlation between firms with higher HDE scores and firms that perform better economically. This does 
not prove that higher labour standards won’t ever lead to lay-offs, but does suggest that firms may gain 
from better standards in a way that outweighs the costs (Standing 2001).  
 
                                                    
9  Economists David Neumark and Scott Adams have used the Current Population Survey (CPS) to estimate the 
employment and income outcomes in cities with living wage ordinances compared to cities without. They 
conclude that the ordinances result in an overall decrease in poverty rates and a small decrease in employment 
(e.g. Neumark and Adams 2000). This work has been critiqued by Brenner et al. (2002), who argue that CPS 
data is not appropriate for measuring living wage ordinance effects, due to the small coverage of living wage 
ordinances and small sample sizes in the CPS.  
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5.2 Does the absence of labour standards lead to employment? 
Interestingly, the inverse of the standards-unemployment question is rarely addressed. Some economists 
may argue that fewer labour standards will create conditions more favourable to growth, but rarely is the 
issue framed around the relation of no labour standards to creating more jobs. As James Heintz argues, 
neither side of the labour standards debate tends to put enough attention on employment in general 
(Heintz 2004). While labour standards opponents emphasise access to employment opportunities, the 
discussion often fails to address larger structural questions. First, Heintz suggests that the labour standards 
debates should include more focus on the institutional relationships between producers and retailers, or 
global commodity chains. In various theories of development, increased labour productivity is one avenue 
for economic growth, leading to higher wages for workers, or employment opportunities for more 
workers. But in many of today’s export industries (such as apparel, electronics and children’s toys), this 
outcome is not possible. These global commodity chains are dominated by large oligopolistic retailers that 
are able to set prices that are paid to producers.10 This means that any gains in labour productivity will not 
be realised by the worker or their immediate employer, but by the retailer, in higher profits, or the end-
consumer, in lower prices.  
Standard economic theory might suggest that one avenue for employment creation for the producers 
is to lower wages even further, thereby lowering the cost of their final cost and increasing demand for 
their product. However, the evidence does not seem to bear this out. For example, as manufacturers have 
moved production around the globe in search of lower wages, they have not necessarily increased 
employment. In fact, Mark Anner finds a striking decrease in employment in many of the industries moving 
from North to Central and South America. For example, auto manufacturers opening new plants in Brazil 
in the 1990s have invested in technologies that dramatically reduce the number of employees needed 
(Anner 2004). As Heintz (2004) points out, ‘labour costs amount to such a small fraction of the wholesale 
and retail price that it would take an enormous reduction in wages or a big increase in productivity to have 
a significant effect on demand.’  
Instead, Heintz argues a more realistic path to employment generation is to raise incomes globally, 
thereby increasing aggregate demand for consumer products. Due to relative price elasticity, ‘growth in the 
global income can lead to proportionately larger growth in demand for such imports, which in turn can 
create substantial numbers of employment opportunities and contribute to reducing inequality.’ This 
would suggest that the absence of labour standards does not create favourable conditions for employment 
growth. Rather, policies resulting in increases in income would more likely result in this outcome. 
 
                                                    
10  This trend seems to be only increasing as Wal-mart increases in size and scope. Numerous retailers and trade 
association leaders have remarked on the growing power of Wal-mart to set prices for entire industries (see e.g. 
Heintz 2004; Featherstone 2004). 
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5.3 Would international labour standards hurt poor countries? 
A second objection to labour standards is that they might not only hurt employment on the micro level 
within firms, but that they could actually impede economic growth on the macro level. In this way, labour 
standards could hurt the countries that are most vulnerable: the poorest countries that are paying the 
lowest wages.  
Those who make this claim must be able to show that there is a negative correlation between 
economic growth and enforcement of labour standards. Ideally, they would then be able to show that the 
latter condition caused the former. Data on both of these questions is difficult to find, as there are many 
measurement issues to consider (particularly, how to measure whether standards are being enforced). 
However, James Heintz of the Political Economy Research Institute uses a simple exercise that plots the 
relationship between initial wage rates for apparel workers against employment growth for 1982–1996 for 
59 countries (Heintz 2002). The wage rates, measured in US dollars, are a three-year average centred on 
1982, while the growth rates are average annual growth rates. Heintz first finds an overall negative 
relationship between wage rates and employment growth, suggesting that certain countries that started off 
with low wages saw job growth. He then examines whether changes in wage rates are associated with 
changes in employment. In this case, there is a negative relationship that appears only after controlling for 
certain factors. Heintz concludes from this that while initial low-wage levels can be important to attract 
industry, it is also possible to experience employment growth and wage growth at the same time. Indeed, 
this was the experience of several Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s.  
Heintz points out that there is still a lot of variation: countries with almost the same wage rates can 
still have very different growth rates. He concludes, ‘If other factors – such as prices, productivity or 
consumer demand – adjust appropriately when wages increase, space can be created to accommodate 
better standards without generating welfare-reducing job losses’ (Heintz 2002: 12). This suggests that 
standard economic models that predict employment loss or decreases in growth as an automatic result of 
wage increases are not complex enough to capture all of the economic and institutional factors involved in 
the actual functioning of markets. 
Elliott and Freeman add to this point, by showing that while there is a correlation between growth 
and poverty reduction, it has been difficult to prove a causal link between free trade policies and growth. 
They cite Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi’s work (2002) as arguing that ‘the quality of institutions 
“trumps everything else” in explaining variations in income levels around the world’ (Elliot and Freeman 
2003: 15). A few countries that appeared to be positive examples of the potential of free trade policies 
have recently suffered severe financial crisis, such as the “East Asian miracle” countries or Argentina. 
Sengenberger (2002) also cites evidence of countries that have a positive relation between enforcement of 
labour rights and economic growth. 
A final concern regarding the potential negative impact on poor countries is the issue of 
enforcement. In particular, some opponents of labour standards suggest that we have no reason to expect 
an equal application of the laws or regulations. Countries with few resources and little power in the global 
economy may be more vulnerable than larger countries. In addition, the US could demand that its trading 
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partners adhere to regulations that it itself does not always follow within its own borders. Because of the 
power of the US market, the negotiations between the US and other countries never occur on an equal 
footing. 
For example, even though the WTO is supposed to have power to enforce decisions over all 
countries, it seems clear that the US is better situated to ignore a WTO ruling than a smaller country. In 
September 2004, the US announced that it would ignore a WTO ruling that requires the US to repeal an 
anti-dumping law known as “the Byrd Amendment”. The Byrd Amendment, passed in October 2000, 
allows the US government to impose duties on countries it claims are dumping goods in the US market 
and then give those duties to the US corporations hurt by import competition.11 The case was brought to 
the WTO by the EU, Canada, Japan, India, Brazil, Mexico, Chile and South Korea, who claim that the law 
impedes their right to free trade and gives US corporations an unfair advantage. The WTO ruled against 
the US and ordered it to repeal the Amendment, but the US Trade Representative’s Office said that it 
would continue to impose duties. This example suggests that it is not effective to set up international rules 
in a context when some players are so much more powerful than others.  
To address this concern we must turn to the general question of monitoring and enforcement. There 
are reasons to believe that labour standards would or could be enforced unevenly between countries, but 
there is also a more general view that the standards will be hard to enforce in any case – whether due to 
lack of resources or political will. This will be discussed in a later section. 
 
5.4 Cash versus “non-cash” standards 
As mentioned above, not all labour standards are the same. While I distinguished between labour rights 
and labour standards, Elliot and Freeman (2003) suggest that the difference is between standards that are 
relatively free or low cost and those that cost money. They and others (e.g. Broad 2001) suggest that the 
main concern of labour activists should be to win the right to collective action. Once workers have the 
right to unionise, they have a mechanism to bargain over other standards, such as wages. Robin Broad 
echoes this, writing that focusing on basic rights such as the right to freedom of association ‘avoids a 
major pitfall: having to determine which standards are appropriate for which corporations or which levels 
of development – a potentially messy judgment call’ (Broad 2001).  
While focusing on the right to organise seems a possible simple solution, there are critics on both 
sides. Opponents of labour standards still suggest that attaching trade sanctions to this right could still 
harm workers in countries where the law was not enforced. Some proponents of labour standards say that 
the right to organise is not enough. For example, Heintz argues that within the current global commodity 
chain structures, workers simply do not have enough power to bargain over wages (Heintz 2004). Indeed, 
even a large swath of unionised workers in the US find themselves relatively powerless to bargain wages 
upward – let alone keep their job. While stories of mass outsourcing are mostly exaggerated in terms of 
                                                    
11  The Amendment went into effect in 2001. From 2001 to 2003, the US collected about $728 million in duties, 
which it gave to about 1000 corporations. For more detail on the countries paying the duties or corporations 
collecting, see www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/sitemap.xml. 
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their impact on total jobs in the US, a recent study found that in the first quarter of 2004, 39 per cent of 
all jobs leaving the country were union jobs (compare this to a national private-sector union density of 
only 8 per cent) (Bronfenbrenner and Luce 2004). Clearly, simply having a union does not provide 
workers in global industries much bargaining power.12 In these cases, it is necessary to establish wage 
standards that serve as a floor, preventing a “race to the bottom” in wages even when unions are present. 
 
5.5 Can labour standards really help workers improve their working conditions? 
Because of the sheer number of factories around the world, many observers are sceptical that labour 
standards can be systematically and rigorously enforced everywhere – at least not by professional 
inspectors. For that reason, a number of scholars have worked on proposals and typologies of monitoring 
agents to develop realistic and workable options for enforcement.  
But first we must be careful to define what we mean by implementation. In other work, I’ve argued 
that implementation of labour law can be divided into four main tasks: administration, monitoring, 
enforcement and evaluation (Luce 2004). Administration includes assigning a department to be 
accountable for implementation, hiring staff, establishing transparent rules and regulations on what is 
covered under the law, and informing covered employers and employees. Monitoring includes various 
means to make sure employers are complying: worksite visits, payroll review and investigating employee 
complaints. Enforcement refers to actions pursued when employers are found to be in non-compliance 
with any of the provisions of the ordinance and can include imposing and collecting fines or sanctions, 
collecting backwages, re-instating employees unjustly fired and negotiating with employers to develop 
reasonable time tables for making improvements. Finally, evaluation refers to steps taken by 
administrators to assess the implementation process over time, including highlighting loopholes and 
looking for ways to correct problems. Ideally, non-governmental parties would be included in the 
evaluation process as well (allowing workers, employers and NGOs to provide feedback). 
 
6  Who will enforce? 
Who will do all of this work in the hundreds of thousands of workplaces around the world? There are a 
number of enforcement models put forth by advocates of labour standards, which can differ on proposals 
about who should have responsibility for monitoring workplaces. Elliot and Freeman (2003) write about 
the need for “vigilantes” and “verifiers”. Vigilantes are self-appointed individuals and non-governmental 
organisations that investigate workplaces, publicise poor working conditions and attempt to generate 
public pressure campaigns to  win improvements.  Verifiers are  organisations or  non-profit organisations 
                                                    
12  It is not only in mobile industries that unions suffer from weak bargaining power. Even in industries such as 
retail, janitorial services, day care and hotels, workers do not always see significant increases in pay with the 
presence of a union. In fact, in a few places unions that have been unable to win significant wage increases 
through bargaining have supported local living wage ordinances as a way to raise union members’ wages 
through legislation. 
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hired by firms, countries, or perhaps even by the vigilantes, to conduct more systematic investigations of 
workplaces. Unlike the vigilantes, verifiers work more cooperatively with the firms to find ways to 
improve working conditions.  
The National Labour Committee (NLC) is an example of a vigilante. This organisation was founded 
by Charlie Kernaghan in 1981 to build labour support for campaigns to end US intervention in Central 
America. Today, the group focuses on labour issues around the world. It has five staff members and 
offices in the US, Central America and Bangladesh. The NLC works on international labour standards 
issues by generating campaigns around particular sectors, employers, or groups of workers, such as the 
‘Toys of Misery’ campaign that publicises working conditions in Chinese toy factories, or the ‘Sean Jean 
Sweatshops’ campaign that focuses on a particular brand of clothing. The NLC works to raise public 
awareness through speaking tours of the workers from the campaigns and other means, in the hopes of 
pressuring employers to improve conditions. The group has won a number of these campaigns, such as 
the 1995 decision by GAP to allow independent monitors to monitor their code of conduct in their 
offshore factories.  
An example of a verifier is the non-profit firm Verité. Verité is an independent auditing firm based in 
Massachusetts. It was founded in 1995, as a response to the growing number of companies that had 
established their own codes of conduct. Private companies hire Verité to inspect their factories and 
produce reports. Sometimes the companies will also work with Verité to develop solutions to the 
problems they find, or conduct trainings to teach the company’s in-house staff to audit working 
conditions.  
Another example of a verifier is the Workers’ Rights Consortium (WRC). The WRC was formed by 
the United Students Against Sweatshops in 2000. The WRC is also a non-profit organisation, which is run 
by a board of USAS representatives, independent labour experts and university representatives (which 
includes some faculty members). The WRC was created because USAS felt that existing verifier 
organisations were not truly independent and were controlled by the corporations that ran them or hired 
them. The WRC has no corporate representatives. Approximately 150 universities and colleges belong to 
the WRC – every year, they must provide the organisation with a list of the companies they buy university-
logo apparel from. Those companies must then provide the WRC with a list of the factories they use for 
production. The WRC maintains a database with information on the factories and conducts selective 
investigations into workplaces. 
Elliott and Freeman do not distinguish between various organisations: meaning they do not argue for 
particular vigilante or verifier groups over others. However, anti-sweatshop activists do debate the 
strengths and weaknesses of particular organisations. The WRC was founded because student sweatshop 
activists were critical of the existing verifier groups – particularly the Fair Labour Association (FLA), a 
verifier organisation that has industry representation. Initially, anti-sweatshop groups felt that the FLA was 
flawed because it was not independent from industry and did not incorporate workers’ voices. USAS 
actively campaigned for universities to join the WRC instead of the FLA. Similarly, some anti-sweatshop 
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activists critique Verité as pro-management. The group is hired by companies rather than workers, and 
some believe this has led to Verité privileging employer needs over thorough investigations.  
In terms of vigilante groups, some activists and scholars have been critical of the National Labour 
Committee (NLC) for its choice of tactics and rhetoric. Kabeer writes about how the NLC coaches young 
women workers who come to the US to do speaking tours about their jobs. They are pushed to speak 
only of the terrible conditions and not to speak of anything positive about the work. The workers are not 
allowed to present a ‘nuanced, balanced and differentiated account of ground-level realities in low-income 
countries – narratives that distinguish between situations in which working conditions are products of 
poverty and under-development, and those that entail the flagrant violation of basic human rights’ 
(Kabeer 2004: 12).13 Some USAS activists have also expressed concerns about the nature of the 
relationships the NLC has with workers. For example, they feel the NLC has not always taken proper 
precautions when visiting workers and union organisers. One year, the NLC took a group of USAS 
activists to Central America. The group met with union organisers who were working underground, as 
there has been a history of violence and murder of union activists. Some students videotaped the 
meetings. The next day, Kernaghan brought the students into a garment factory without permission. 
Guards stopped the group and confiscated their bags, including the videotapes of the clandestine 
meetings. This suggests that there may be a need to develop criteria for what makes for more politically 
effective vigilante and verifier groups. 
While vigilantes and verifiers may both have a role to play in monitoring and enforcement, there are 
other stakeholders that may also be relevant. These include government agencies, international bodies 
such as the ILO, unions and the workers themselves. Ideally, as Elliott and Freeman themselves point out, 
workers in the factories would have unions, thereby providing a vehicle for workers to complain about 
conditions and bargain over improvements. It is the workers themselves that are the best judges of what 
wage they need and whether or not improvements made are adequate. Unfortunately to date, neither the 
vigilantes nor verifiers have had great success in helping create the conditions for workers to form their 
own independent unions. Other scholars echo this concern. Naila Kabeer (2000) writes that in the midst 
of heated debate about the sweatshop issue, ‘the views of Third World women workers themselves were 
largely unsought and unheard’ (Kabeer 2000: x). Guy Standing of the ILO adds that whether it is a large 
multi-national employing thousands of teenage women in Malaysia, or a small informal firm in China with 
two employees, ‘what was lacking was the voice of the workers, which was needed to pressure managers 
to make feasible changes and to give them knowledge of what to do’ (Standing 2001). 
We cannot rely only on the workers themselves to monitor working conditions, for several reasons. 
First, without job security workers will be reluctant to come forward to make public complaints about 
working conditions for fear that they will be fired or disciplined. Second, some workplaces have high 
turnover, making it hard for workers to stay up-to-date on particular regulations, such as health and safety 
                                                    
13  The NLC says that the women who speak on the tours are speaking of their experiences and speaking of their 
own free will. This could be interpreted as an extension of Kabeer’s argument: just as the women who work in 
the garment factories are not passive victims, neither are the women who tour the US puppets of the NLC. 
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laws and difficult to ensure steady, systematic monitoring. Third, we cannot assume workers will have the 
time and resources to monitor workplaces and get the information to those who enforce the laws. For 
these reasons, it is necessary to bring other parties in to complement the monitoring efforts. These could 
include the vigilante and verifiers mentioned above. It could also include local-based community 
organisations. According to research by O’Rourke (2004) and Luce (2004), civil society organisations can 
play a vital role in enforcing regulations. O’Rourke looks at six case studies of environmental laws in 
Vietnam and finds that local governments on their own were not effective in enforcement. However, once 
community “bottom up pressures” of various forms were incorporated, monitoring and enforcement 
dramatically improved. Luce studied implementation of local living wage ordinances in over 80 US cities 
and found similar results. Where community organisations were involved in implementation – through 
outside protest, and/or through formal channels, living wage laws were much more likely to be enforced. 
Both authors conclude that governments do not have enough resources or incentives to enforce a range 
of regulations. Incorporating community organisations or unions that do have the motive and can add 
capacity, can improve monitoring and enforcement. Doing this should not mean that workers should be 
left out of the process. Rather, outside parties should be treated as complements, not substitutes, to the 
workers’ efforts.  
 
7  Mechanisms for enforcement 
The question of “who” does the monitoring is closely related to the “how” – and specifically, what kinds 
of enforcement power the monitors should have. While most advocate some kinds of “soft law” remedies 
(recommendations and other informal incentives), there is disagreement about whether monitors should 
also have the formal power of “hard law” enforcement options (legal remedies such as economic 
sanctions). 
Elliott and Freeman note that neither the vigilantes nor the verifiers have formal legal power. Rather, 
they rely on market pressure to get companies to improve standards. Their argument is that the cost of 
raising standards is relatively low in most cases and that cost could be covered easily through one of two 
means. First, the apparel industry is dominated by several large retailers who make substantial profits. 
Second, most studies show that consumers are willing to pay higher prices for sweat-free apparel. This 
means that there is enough room for the industry to improve labour conditions, with enough market 
pressure.  
Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel (2001) also support the concept of improving labour standards through 
market pressure. Specifically, they argue that the most effective method does not rely on ‘top-down 
regulation based on uniform standards on one hand and reliance on voluntary initiatives taken by 
corporations in response to social protest on the other’ (ibid: 2). Their model, which they call Ratcheting 
Labour Standards (RLS), is based on creating formal, social and market incentives for firms to follow 
standards, and establishing a clear and transparent database that would make results of all inspections 
public. To participate in the system, retailers and manufacturers would need to adopt a code of conduct 
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and then select a monitor to regularly inspect its factories. Those findings would go into the database. The 
database would be held by a “super monitor” or umpire – an organisation created by major players such as 
the ILO, World Bank, international trade union confederations and key NGOs.  
At the same time, Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel acknowledge that some “top-down” regulatory 
measures may be needed. In particular, companies may have to be required by law to provide a list of their 
factory locations. Others suggest that relying on market pressures alone is unrealistic and unlikely to result 
in major change without some “hard law” measures. There are additional concerns about existing labour 
standards monitoring programmes. One is that the vigilantes and verifiers described above focus on work 
in export industries. As Elliot and Freeman acknowledge, including a social clause in trade agreements 
would not address working conditions in non-traded sectors, such as domestic work and many forms of 
service work.  
A related issue is whether the standards could be enforced in the informal sector, where a growing 
share of garment work is done. Could we expect monitors to enter private homes, where a small number 
of women and children may work? As many scholars point out, not only has there been a rapid increase in 
the extent of informal work in most countries, but there is not even necessarily a clear distinction between 
the formal and informal sectors. According to Guy Standing of the ILO, ‘[A] lesson from our surveys is 
that distinctions between “formal” and “informal” sectors make no sense. Informalisation has spread 
everywhere, including within so-called formal enterprises. This means that formalistic monitoring can only 
relate to a small part of the economy’ (Standing 2001). However, recognising the limitations of the 
“informal sector” concept, the ILO revised its definition in 2002 to include a larger “informal economy”. 
Acknowledging that there is still no single definition of the informal economy, the ILO states that this 
new term is more diverse – including wage-workers and the self-employed (or “own-account” workers). 
These workers share key characteristics: ‘they are not recognised or protected under the legal and 
regulatory framework’ and they experience a ‘high degree of vulnerability’ (International Labour 
Organization 2002). The ILO argues that it is a goal to achieve “decent work” for those in the informal 
economy, but that progress must be understood as a process, rather than a standard. The process includes 
multiple steps, such as legalising the work.  
Others point out that most of the labour standards debate focuses on the global South, but ignores 
working conditions in the global North. As Kent Wong argues, the AFL-CIO’s petitions about China’s 
unfair trade advantages based on denying worker rights is hypocritical, as US employers notoriously 
violate labour law, including suppressing worker’s right to unionise; routinely violating wage, safety and 
health laws; and discriminating in employment and wages based on race, gender and other characteristics. 
Guy Standing suggests that countries that undercut their own labour laws are perhaps a more serious 
concern than countries that don’t have minimum labour standards at all.  
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8  Political arguments for labour standards 
The economic arguments above avoid the most persuasive argument for international labour standards, 
which is that many of the standards are actually rights: whether they are civil rights, human rights or 
political rights. As mentioned above, the ILO treats the eight core labour standards essentially as basic 
rights, that anyone is entitled to in any country, no matter what level of development. Amartya Sen writes 
that some of these basic standards are basic political rights, that should be a given. Indeed, many of the 
standards are reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was ratified by all United 
Nations member states.  
In reality, many labour struggles involve a variety of mechanisms and tactics, including campaigns for 
enforcement of domestic regulations, enlisting public pressure and using international pressure when 
available. I argue that the four types of labour standards listed in Table 4.2 should be seen as complements 
and not substitutes. Below, I provide some examples where different tactics were combined in labour 
struggles. 
In addition, many labour struggles of the last century contain the same kinds of elements as found in 
today’s anti-sweatshop movement, including protectionism. For example, a large segment of the US 
abolitionist movement was the white working class that saw slave labour as a threat to the notion of “free 
labour”. Slaves in the North were craftsmen who competed directly with the “free worker”. In the South, 
slavery as a concept degraded the notion of work. According to Martinot (2000): 
 
This ideology derived from the Jacksonian valorisation of the “producing class” of workers and 
artisans. It affirmed the dignity and honour of work, and opposed slavery as demeaning to labour – 
but only within a white orientation. Ideologically, it equated black workers, both free and slave, with 
slavery and servility. It thus became part of the rationale for advocating the exclusion of all African-
Americans from the new territories, on the claim that their mere presence would degrade the honour 
of white labour. All in all, white workers opposed slavery to exclude black people and opposed black 
people to exclude slavery. 
 
In this sense, white workers fought to abolish slavery to protect the sanctity of their own jobs. At the 
same time, the existence of a protectionist movement did not preclude the formation of other abolitionist 
movements based on the concept of human rights. These rights-based movements included slaves 
themselves, who worked to end slavery by escaping, buying freedom and other forms of resistance; freed 
slaves and free blacks; religious organisations that saw slavery as an affront to God’s will (such as the 
primarily white Quakers); and other allies in the US and elsewhere around the globe, who objected to 
slavery based on political and moral grounds.  
The same was true later on, when movements to restrict child labour, regulate homework and 
establish minimum wage and hours laws developed. On the one hand, primarily white male trade unions 
advocated for protective legislation that would limit the ability of employers to hire children and women. 
This would not only keep more jobs available for union men, but would prevent challenging notions of 
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masculinity associated with particular occupations and industries. Some of the initial arguments for 
minimum wage laws were based on the concept of the family wage. By paying men enough money, they 
could provide for their families and their wives and children would not have to work, reinforcing 
traditional gender roles.  
Again, these protectionist motives were paralleled by efforts of reformers with other goals. For 
example, early advocates of a “living wage” argued that those who must sell their labour to survive were 
entitled to the “full fruits of their labour”. Catholic priest Father John Ryan wrote in 1906 that companies 
had a moral obligation to pay their workers a living wage. Despite the gendered connotations of the 
“family wage”, many women were among the strongest advocates for minimum wage legislation. As 
historian Eileen Boris points out, the early minimum wage campaigns were in part a strategic response to 
court decisions that prohibited minimum wages for men, using the 14th Amendment as a basis to rule 
minimum wages as an infringement on the “freedom of contract” – but only for male workers. The courts 
saw women ‘as dependents and without the vote, whose potential motherhood placed them under the 
police powers of the state’ – therefore clearing the way for regulation on their behalf. Others used similar 
rhetoric, suggesting that labour standards were necessary to protect helpless and vulnerable women who 
could not advocate on their own behalf. Cynthia Daniels writes how social reformers fought to regulate 
industrial homework ‘on the claim that such work polluted the home and degraded the act of mothering’ 
(Daniels 1989: 21). The language used in these early campaigns is remarkably similar to language used 
today in describing “sweatshop workers”. 
The Women’s Trade Union League (WTUL) – ‘a cross class organisation which fought for industrial 
equality for women as wage earners’ (Boris 2001) saw this opening to pass wage legislation as a way to 
improve their chances for organising in an industry notoriously difficult to work within. There had been 
efforts by consumers’ leagues to improve working conditions for garments through consumer pressure 
(by labelling garments as essentially “sweat-free”), but these efforts were of only limited success and only 
‘regulated the market after the fact of exploitation’ (Boris 2001). Inspired in part by movements in Britain 
and Australia, the WTUL and other US activists fought for minimum wage laws where they could. This 
example again suggests that it is possible to have political movements that contain a range of motives 
within them at the same time, including protectionist wings and elements of self-organisation - from 
consumers to unions to priests. 
These examples may help see today’s struggles around labour standards in a different light. Although 
there are protectionist labour unions and paternalistic NGOs within the larger movement, it does not rule 
out the possibility for workers to use the threat of trade sanctions to get labour standards enforced. For 
example, banana workers in Guatemala were able to build an international campaign to fight illegal firings 
of union members by Del Monte. Workers at Del Monte had been unionised for several decades, 
represented by SITRABI (Sindicato de Trabajadores de Bananeros de Izabal). But due in part to pressures 
by large customers (i.e. Wal-mart) to lower costs, Del Monte began efforts to break the union. In October  
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1999, the company illegally fired 900 workers (one-quarter of the workforce) and then sent 200 armed 
guards to the union hall where the union leaders were forced at gunpoint to resign their leadership 
positions. The leaders resigned and, threatened with death if they stayed, fled into hiding.  
SITRABI had connections with a US-based NGO called US/LEAP, which had been engaged in US-
Central American labour solidarity work. SITRABI and US/LEAP worked together to apply direct 
pressure on the employer through a corporate campaign and indirect pressure through threatening 
Guatemala with US trade sanctions using the General System of Preferences (GSP). US/LEAP worked 
with unions to help the exiled leaders get out of the country and testify about the situation. They then all 
worked together to get the US Trade Representative’s office to suggest that it would apply sanctions if the 
Guatemalan government did not address the situation. In the end, the Guatemalan government gave in 
and promised to make arrests and hold a trial for those who had threatened the workers’ lives. Pressure 
from the Guatemalan government, along with pressure from an international corporate campaign led to 
success in the end: 650 of the workers were rehired, the union leaders were reinstated, and most of the 
wage and benefit cuts were avoided. According to US/LEAP: 
 
‘ … the ability to use the GSP pressure and its focus on impunity was helped immensely by the fact 
that Guatemala has been on the GSP hot seat for nearly 10 years, due to the work of various 
organisations including US/LEAP, the AFL-CIO and the International Labour Rights Fund … It 
was also important that the Guatemalan trade union movement had long been engaged in using the 
GSP process and was now ready to support suspension of benefits despite high risks’.14 
 
In this case, Guatemalan unionists were able to use labour standards via the GSP to pressure their own 
government and employer. Although the GSP is a unilateral trade policy that would not seem on the face 
of it to favour workers’ rights struggles, unions and NGOs were able to use it as a tool, to gain leverage in 
their struggle. However, they did not rely solely on the international pressure. Their campaign also tried to 
get domestic labour regulations enforced and appealed to voluntary measures through the corporate 
campaign. 
Worker organisations have used the same threat of GSP trade sanctions in Nicaragua and Honduras, 
alongside other tactics. For example, workers in Honduras began organising for a union at the Kimi 
garment plant in 1997. The union met all conditions necessary under law to establish a union 
(SITRAKIMIH) but management refused to negotiate. After numerous rulings by the Honduran Labour 
Ministry requiring the company to negotiate, it finally did so, but in bad faith. Finally, the union worked 
with the US union UNITE (Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees) to build a 
campaign to pressure the US Trade Representative to threaten Honduras with trade sanctions. It was only 
when this became a serious threat that Kimi  management began  serious negotiations.  An agreement was 
                                                    
14  US/LEAP, ‘Lessons from the SITRABI Victory’, US/LEAP Newsletter April, 2001. www.usleap.org/trade/ 
SITRABITrial/LessonsfromSITRABI4-01.html (accessed 31 October 2004).  
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reached in March 1999. It is important to note that the threat of sanctions was not enough to lead to the 
successful contract. The union also relied on a range of tactics, from member mobilisation to international 
and technical support from other unions.15  
These examples suggest that trade sanctions – even unilateral ones – can be used in a positive way to 
help workers improve working conditions, when used in conjunction with other tactics. The important 
lesson is that sanctions are simply a tool for organising. What is crucial is the way in which this tool is 
used. Sanctions can be a blunt tool used in a way that harms workers; but can also be used in a 
constructive fashion as one part of a larger campaign. 
What are the conditions that distinguish a constructive international campaign from one that can 
harm workers? Several authors point to necessary factors. First, it is imperative that the workers affected 
have a voice in the direction of the campaign. This means that international campaigns cannot be driven 
from abroad (specifically, US-based NGOs or unions cannot be driving campaigns in global south 
countries). A few unions in Central America have noted problematic corporate campaigns launched by 
US-based NGOs such as the National Labour Committee, contrasting them to work done by NGOs that 
maintain a local presence such as US/LEAP which works in Guatemala City (Frundt 2005). 
It also means that the unions representing the workers should be authentic – not state-controlled, 
and democratic. Union democracy, or member control – is a challenge for any union, in any country, so it 
is unrealistic to expect purity on this dimension. However, unions that are top-down are less likely to meet 
the criteria of involving workers. 
It is also important to examine the kinds of organisations involved in the international solidarity 
efforts. In the recent case of the AFL-CIO to impose trade sanctions on China through the Trade Act, the 
AFL-CIO’s main coalitional partner in this effort is the US National Association of Manufacturers 
(NAM). There are no Chinese worker organisation partners in this campaign. As Kent Wong from the 
University of California-Los Angeles Labour Centre says: ‘They are misleading workers into believing that 
the NAM are our allies, while China is our enemy’ (Wong 2004: 91). He argues that a more effective 
campaign to improve working conditions in China, and the US, would come from a coalition of US and 
Chinese workers and unions, not US unions and manufacturers. 
This leads into a related point, which is that more effective campaigns do not focus blame on 
countries: rather, they focus primarily on employers. While it can be effective to point out that certain 
countries do not enforce labour laws, a purely country-based campaign is likely to heighten protectionist 
sentiments. It also fails to note that many countries do a poor job on labour law enforcement. Therefore, 
for US unions to critique China or Mexico for ignoring labour law takes attention away from the fact that 
US labour law is terribly weak and parts of it routinely ignored. 
How does this point relate to the question of labour standards and trade sanctions? The use of trade 
sanctions through mechanisms like the GSP are not necessarily the ideal tool for improving labour 
                                                    
15  It is also important to note that a number of these victories were not sustained. In some plants where workers 
eventually won a union and a contract, the factory eventually shut down and moved elsewhere. I’m not arguing 
that the use of trade sanctions is a guarantee of success, or even that it will lead to sustained victory. I’m simply 
arguing that it can be a useful tool in worker struggles.  
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standards, because they do in fact penalise countries rather than corporations. The first goal of any 
international labour rights campaign should be to target the corporation that is violating worker rights. But 
since this is not always easy or possible, governments can sometimes be used as leverage. Although 
countries as a whole don’t violate workers’ rights, governments do aid and abet corporations. Activists must be 
careful not to lose this distinction. To the extent that campaigns target governments, it must be framed as 
a way to apply pressure on corporations and not on the country as a whole. 
Finally, the campaigns should frame the struggle for labour standards as political struggles, as much 
as economic ones. A great deal of the debate over labour standards returns to economics: how much is a 
living wage? Will employers cut employment if forced to comply with standards? What is the relationship 
between standards and growth? While these questions are important, they can de-politicise the issue. The 
market itself is a political construct and forces within it are not pre-determined. Eileen Boris echoes this 
point when she writes of the early feminist involvement in campaigns for US labour standards: 
‘Economists portray the wage as a market force, but feminists understand it as a product of gendered, 
indeed racialised gendered, ideology, reflecting structures of power and authority within the society’ (Boris 
2001).  
The political struggle for labour standards must be placed in the larger context of political struggles 
over and within the WTO. There is no doubt that the WTO is an institution biased toward wealthy 
countries. There is also no doubt that the WTO is an institution designed to expand the rights of capital. 
In this context, we should argue that the WTO be abolished, as an undemocratic and illegitimate form of 
governance. But can we also still argue for a social clause within the WTO? History and political theory 
tells us that the way in which struggles are waged can be as important as the actual content of the demand. 
This means that there is a difference between a reformist demand to amend the WTO and a revolutionary 
demand. The former accepts the WTO as a legitimate authority; the latter rejects this idea. The 
revolutionary demand for international labour standards in the WTO is built on the idea that the inclusion 
of labour standards in the WTO could fundamentally transform it, or lead to its demise. 
 
9  Other options for improving working conditions? 
Finally, we should consider whether there are alternative strategies for improving working conditions of 
the global workforce. I argue that there are in fact a number of strategies, but they should be seen as 
complements, not substitutes. Many of these efforts are already underway: pressure on the IMF and 
World Bank to abolish structural adjustment programmes/poverty reduction strategy programmes, or to 
at least make a more serious effort to respond to criticisms and address poverty, equality and employment 
issues; pressure on the World Trade Organisation to address the outstanding “Doha Declaration”; the 
movement for debt relief; and the movement against new trade agreements such as the Central American 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).  
Labour attorney Lance Compa, among others, suggests that it is possible to use lawsuits to penalise 
corporations that violate workers’ rights, even in international cases (Compa 2002). In some ways, he 
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points out, this is an ideal mechanism to enforce standards as it punishes the employer rather than the 
country. It can also allow workers to sue the parent company, rather than fight only with a subcontractor 
that is their direct employer. Compa gives several examples of how lawyers have used the law to penalise 
corporations, such as a group of Korean workers that worked near Seoul for a New York based company, 
Pico Products Inc. After the workers unionised and won a collective bargaining agreement in 1989, Pico 
closed its factory without warning – owing the workers wages for work done, as well as severance pay. 
Although the company violated both the union contract and Korean labour law, the workers felt their 
chances for penalising the company were strongest in US courts, as the company was based in the US. In 
the end the workers did not win the case, but since a federal judge accepted the case, it set a precedent for 
future cases. Lawsuits have the advantage of “hard law”: legally enforceable rulings. But there are many 
challenges to this approach: the law governing international worker rights is not clear (such as whether US 
law has “extraterritorial reach”), corporations usually have many more resources to stall and win a case, 
and US law is not favourable to workers in the first place. Still, Compa argues that litigation should be 
considered ‘one of many possible avenues to advance workers’ rights in the global economy’. 
Other strategies include pushing states to invest in industrial policies that could focus on 
employment generation and ones that could lead to industrial upgrading.16 Finally, unions have undertaken 
efforts at cross-border organising. This includes unions working in the same industry in different countries 
sharing resources and information, sometimes even sending organisers to each other’s countries to help 
with work. In other cases, workers have collaborated on joint campaigns against the same employer.17  
 
10  Conclusion: Arguments for internationalist international labour 
standards 
There are many reasons why workers and labour activists should be wary of initiatives coming from the 
global North. Even withstanding US foreign policy, the AFL-CIO has a dismal history in international 
labour issues, from funding the American Federation of International Labour Development (AFILD), to 
its stance on immigration. For these reasons, labour activists are justified in suspecting the motives of US 
unions calling for international labour standards that are meant ‘to protect third world workers’. Similarly, 
history in the US and elsewhere shows that well meaning outside organisations who believe they are 
helping those with less power may in fact make conditions worse. NGOs claiming to be improving 
working conditions in sweatshops may employ paternalistic, patronising and demeaning language to 
describe the workers; presenting them as passive victims.  
Yet the existence of groups with protectionist or paternalistic motives does not inherently negate the 
validity of the demand. Indeed, there are others in the movement for international labour standards who 
recognise the problems with the above-mentioned groups, yet still find the struggle worth pursuing. Some 
of these are the organisations of affected workers in countries such as Guatemala or Honduras, who see 
                                                    
16  For more on this see Heintz and Pollin (2003). 
17  For more detail, see Ralph Armbruster-Sandoval (2005); Henry Frundt (1998) and others. 
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potential problems with the labour standards approach, but realise they have few options to struggle for 
better working conditions. Furthermore, the economic evidence does not show that labour standards 
reduce employment. Rather, the reality is much more complex. The relationship between labour law, 
wages, economic growth, employment and inequality is context-specific, depending greatly on macro-
economic and political variables. Research to date suggests that it is not possible to predict a specific 
employment outcome when labour standards are established. 
The history of NAFTA suggests to labour activists that the best case scenario is to have no new trade 
agreements, such as the impending CAFTA or Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA). But if CAFTA 
cannot be defeated, a CAFTA with labour standards is preferable to one without. Given the state of 
labour organising and labour rights in most countries that would be covered by CAFTA, any tool that 
might possibly serve as leverage cannot be dismissed.  
Of course, for many reasons the debate itself is perhaps overblown. Labour standards are unlikely to 
enter the agenda seriously any time soon. Little progress of any kind has been made at the WTO in recent 
meetings. As Basu notes, even the struggle for labour standards within the US took a very long time: ‘It is 
sobering to recall that in the United States the attempt to bring all states under a common labour code was 
on the agenda for decades (actively from 1906) before it could finally be implemented in the form of the 
Fair Labour Standards Act in 1938.’ The reality is that most of the agenda behind the WTO has not been 
about trade, but investment. Multinational corporations and wealthy investors want to have the right to 
protect their investments in other countries and invest in lucrative arenas such as government assets. The 
same is true for many free-trade agreements, such as NAFTA and CAFTA, which are not motivated so 
much by a desire for US companies to sell goods to Latin American consumers, but by their desire to 
invest in those countries. This means that at their core, these institutions and agreements are about 
expanding the rights of capital. Because much of the capital-labour relationship is a zero sum game, as the 
rights of capital grow, the rights of labour recede. The challenge for labour is to find any handle – any 
possible leverage – to increase their power relative to the power of capital.  
Given that labour is on the defensive in most countries, the issue is not likely to make much headway 
in any of the relevant agreements. Still, it is important to clarify what our demands are: the demands of 
those who wish to build international working class power. In the end, it is not so much the labour 
standards themselves, but the way in which the fight for the standards happens and the way in which they 
are used that matters. Labour standards should be seen simply in that way: as a tool to aid in further 
organising, rather than as a solution to poor working conditions.  
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